INTRODUCTION
Many current distributed systems are satiable; users will stop providing service to others if they are themselves receiving a sufficient quantity of service. This is often the product of "tit-fortat-like" designs, which attempt to combat free riding by denying service to those who are not providing it. While this approach provides an incentive for cooperation, it has the unfortunate side effect that if there is no service for a peer to provide, then he will generally receive reduced or no service. Ironically, this opens the systems up to an attack that we call the lotus-eater attack: the attacker supplies the service to some peers, thus satiating them. Once those peers are satiated, they stop providing service to others. The peers not being satiated by the attacker then receive reduced or no service.
A wide range of systems are satiable and thus potentially vulnerable to this attack. In BitTorrent [1] , peers restrict trade to the best partners they can find. Similarly, in BAR Gossip [3] peers stop trading when there is nothing they want. In scrip systems (e.g. [4] ), peers need to perform service for others often enough to maintain a supply of money and will stop once their supply is adequate. Even systems not designed to be tit-for-tat-like may be satiable. For example, a node in a sensor network might shut down to save power if it has received all the updates it needs.
ATTACKING BAR GOSSIP
In BAR Gossip, a broadcaster releases updates that nodes need to collect by a deadline. For example, in a streaming video application, the updates are frames of the video. To mount an attack on BAR Gossip, the attacker divides the nodes into two groups: satiated nodes, to whom the attacker attempts to provide as many updates as possible, and isolated nodes, to whom the attacker provides no service. Since nodes have a fixed number of trade opportunities and only trade updates when they expect to receive something in return, isolated nodes will have a hard time trading. Figure 1 shows the results of three versions of the attack on a BAR Gossip system using the same parameters as and an updated version of the simulation from [3] . Nodes needed to receive more than 93% of the updates for the stream to be usable. The results in Figure 1 are for the 30% of nodes that are isolated; satiated nodes receive near perfect service. The curve labeled "crash attack" provides a baseline where the attacker simply does nothing. The "ideal Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). PODC'08, August 18-21, 2008, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. ACM 978-1-59593-989-0/08/08. lotus-eater attack" curve assumes that attacking nodes can immediately send updates to all satiated nodes as soon as they receive them. The "trade lotus-eater attack" curve makes the typically more reasonable assumption that the attacker can give updates to nodes only during interactions dictated by the protocol. These results suggest that lotus-eater attacks are a potential problem for BAR Gossip. The need for a smaller fraction under the attacker's control may make it possible to launch a lotus-eater attack in some settings where a standard Byzantine crash attack would be impossible. We should note, however, that this does require enough bandwidth at each attacking node to satiate multiple nodes every round while the crash attack requires essentially no bandwidth beyond that needed to maintain the nodes in the system. Additional results and discussion are available in [2] 
